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Abstract: What does pop culture have to say about the subjects of our time? In this article, the authors propose a 
way of reading the productions of pop culture betting that, in the contemporaneity, it flourishes, in the territory 
traditionally reserved for mythology, as enunciator of the modes of subjectivation. In the psychoanalytic approach 
of myths from Freud and Lacan, the function of covering the Real of the helplessness, in a rationalist era, is played 
by fictions that leave traces and make it possible, through variance and repetition, to unveil the underlying 
structure that engenders them. Finally, it is proposed that if these productions are consumed with such voracity, 
it is because they say something about the subjects who are targeted – that is, about the subjectivity of this time.
Keywords: psychoanalysis, pop culture, myths.
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Introduction
By the time the initial lines of this article were 
developed, in December 2015, news media had reported 
that The Force Awakens, one of the latest episodes of the 
Star Wars franchise, surpassed worldwide revenue of U$ 
1.000.000.000 with less than a month after release (to be 
exact, it only took twelve days) (Abrams, 2015). At the 
movie premiere, thousands of people gathered in movie 
theaters around the globe dressed as the characters in the 
universe created by George Lucas – who, incidentally, is 
not alone in the billion-dollar income productions club: 
23 films star in the group led by Avatar, James Cameron 
(2009)1. It is an undeniably recent phenomenon; in this 
group, only three members were produced before the 
turn of the 21st century and almost all of them settled 
in a territory still very little explored by psychoanalysis: 
pop culture. Although total number of viewers are not as 
easy to calculate, box office data show that at the turn of 
the 21st century, film reach achieved levels the Lumière 
brothers could never dream of.
This brief exposes the conditions under which 
this article was elaborated: it was instigated by an 
expressive and intriguing social phenomenon, on the 
one hand, and, on the other hand, crossed by research 
involving contemporary cinema that, incidentally, also 
deals with the pop culture – as depending on the scope, 
it becomes virtually impossible to decouple one from the 
other. The mention of Star Wars is not accidental: the first 
film, in 1977, established a turning point, with movies 
becoming toys, comics, books, video games, television 
advertisements, action figures and all sorts of derivatives 
that the industry can imagine, instituting the phenomenon 
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1 Data extracted from Box Office Mojo, April 2016. Retrieved from https://
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that today is recognized by the title of transmedia (Lucas, 
1977). Because of their power, cinema and pop culture 
– with the masses they mobilize, the images they offer, 
and the constellations of signifiers that set them in motion 
– are not something we can neglect as we look at the 
constitution of the contemporary subject. Hence the 
question that drives this article: what do contemporary 
cultural productions, especially cinematographic works, 
have to say about the subjects of our time? Our bet is that, 
in contemporary times, pop culture springs from the soil 
traditionally reserved for mythology as an enunciator of 
subjectivation. As a propeller of this discussion, it will 
be important to recapitulate the place that psychoanalysis 
reserves for myths and pop culture.
Myths and psychoanalysis
The study of myths goes much further than the 
emergence of psychoanalysis and is too broad to be 
synthesized in this article. From its scope, what interests 
us is to make a cut-off that places its approaches in 
relation to the psychoanalytic discourse. We begin with 
the etymology of the term myth offered by Jassanan 
Pastore (2012, p. 20):
The word myth has its Greek origin in mythos, 
which derives from the verb mytheio, to tell, 
to narrate, and mytheo, to count, to talk to. In 
archaic Greece, mid-8th to 6th century a. C., the 
primordial sense of the term mythos was word or 
speech, attached to a narrative linked to the gods 
and heroes. In Greek literature, mythos arises with 
the sense of history or narrative being conveyed 
through the word. The narrator, a poet/aedo 
chosen by the gods, has the sacred word, because 
it comes from a divine revelation and it is therefore 
taken as truth.
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Freud made extensive use of mythical narratives 
in his theoretical elaboration. Whether they were drawn 
from Greek tragedies, Polynesian customs, Jewish 
scriptures, or Christian demonology, the instigator of 
the analytical discourse gave them reasonably uniform 
treatment, using them to illustrate, sustain, and expand 
their clinical findings. Freud’s hypothesis (1908/2006d), 
enunciated in Creative Writers and Day-dreaming, is that 
myths would constitute “distorted vestiges of fantasies 
full of desires of entire nations, the secular dreams of 
young humanity” (p. 242). When the myths he had at 
his disposal seemed insufficient to him, the founder of 
psychoanalysis proposed new narratives: in Totem and 
Taboo (Freud, 1913/2006e), he predominantly emphasized 
the phenomenology of rites and prohibitions of primitive 
societies to develop the hypothesis of the primal horde; 
in Moses and Monotheism (Freud, 1939/2006f), Freud 
took into account Egyptian and Jewish narratives, in 
order to compose a historical truth about the murder 
of a religious leader. Both versions of an original 
parricide (the first as founder of civilization, the second 
as organizer of monotheism) are treated by Freud as 
a historical reality. Lacan (1969-1970/1992), on The 
other side of psychoanalysis, is particularly critical of 
Freudian propositions. To the French psychoanalyst, 
Freud’s insistence that the murder of the father of the 
horde as well as the murder of Moses would be historical 
facts seems uncomfortable. Would it be too generous of 
us to relativize Lacanian acidity and to propose that in 
both cases it was a matter of establishing a construction 
which sought to shed light on the repression of culture?
A reader of Freud, Lévi-Strauss used myths in the 
fulcrum of his theoretical elaboration. Instead of seeking 
an original or authentic version of the myth, Levi-Strauss 
supported the structural analysis of the myth, that is, 
the consideration of all variants of the myth in the same 
measure, observing the repetitions that reveal its internal 
framework. In Myth and Meaning, Lévi-Strauss (1978) sees 
the character of helplessness present in the myth, noting 
that it offers the illusion that humans can understand the 
universe and, more than that, that they really understand 
it. Although to the anthropologist such an illusion is 
extremely important, it fails to give man greater dominion 
over nature – thus differing from the success of scientific 
thought. While masterfully describing the characteristics, 
functions, and structure of myths, Levi-Strauss avoided 
circumscribing them into an operational definition – a 
more prudent choice than that made by Albino Magno, 
who, in the initial lines of the volume addressed to his 
students, states:
The name mythology is given to the fables or 
erroneous beliefs that formed the basis of the 
religion of the Greeks and the Romans and of all 
the other peoples of the earth, except for the Jews. 
The worship of false gods, the worship of idols, is 
called idolatry or paganism. (s/d, p. 7)
Refraining from producing an ethnocentric 
conceptualization about a cultural phenomenon is a never-
ending challenge; otherwise, we would have to question 
ourselves: is every form of understanding of the world that 
distances itself from modern Western reasoning a myth? Or 
does Western reasoning itself have a mythic structure? Let’s 
put this question on hold for now.
The Romanian mythologist Mircea Eliade (1972), 
while recognizing the difficulties of delimiting his research 
object, proposed that “the myth tells a sacred story; it 
tells about an event occurring in primordial time” (p. 
9), in which something was brought into existence by 
the intervention of the supernatural. Eliade points out 
that it is always about a “true” story – “false” stories, 
like fables and vulgar tales, would not fit into myth. The 
distinction between true and false narratives is, however, 
a methodological setback; the accounts transmitted under 
the sign of truth by one group may be perceived as false by 
another. Eliade points out that the transmission rite plays 
a key role in this differentiation – true stories would not 
be unceremonious in their counting, while false stories 
are reported on a daily basis, without observing the rigors 
that would be fit to genuine myths.
Preserving Eliade’s idea that myths provide 
models for human activities, valuation and significance 
to existence, Junito de Souza Brandão (1986) offers an 
interesting way out: “myths are the imagistic language 
of principles . . . a collective representation, transmitted 
through several generations and which reports an 
explanation of the world” (p. 38). Enthusiastic about 
Jung’s formulations, Brandão observes in the myths an 
inexhaustible repository of symbols that would allow 
access to the “conscious to the collective unconscious”, 
and was particularly interested in myths that would fit 
this description.
Roland Barthes brings a more comprehensive and 
flexible concept, which Brandão only partially agrees with: 
myths act fundamentally as a system of communication. 
“This is why it could not be an object, a concept or an 
idea: it is a mode of signification, a form”, says Barthes 
(2009, pp. 297-298). Brandão’s disagreement lies in what 
he considers a reduction of the concept of myth in Barthes, 
which would present it as any substitutable form of truth. 
If myth is a speech, everything can be a myth: “every 
object in the world can move from a closed, mute existence 
to an oral state, open to the appropriation of society, for 
no law, natural or not, can prevent us from talking about 
things”, Barthes (2009, p. 298) provokes.
The work of Jacques Lacan helps us to situate 
the question of myth within the psychoanalytic field. 
Lacan (1956-1957/1995), who, unlike Freud, had access 
to the contributions of Levi-Strauss, emphasized myth’s 
linguistic aspects: “what is called a myth, be it religious 
or folkloric, at any stage of its legacy is represented as a 
narrative” (p. 258), with the myth entailing a character 
of fiction – even if it is a stable fiction, not easily bent 
to individual flavors. It is, therefore, a collective fiction 
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that, however, has singular effects in each subject. In 
the seminar The other side of psychoanalysis, Lacan 
(1969-1970/1992) synthesizes the meaning of myth as a 
statement of the impossible. Which impossible is that? The 
impossible reduction of the Real to the Symbolic and the 
Imaginary. This conclusion arises when we consider that 
Lacan (1956-1957/1995), at an earlier time, emphasized 
that the mythical category refers to the relation of man “to 
the existence of the subject himself and to the horizons 
that his experience brings him” (p. 259), existence whose 
genesis is permanently seen as an enigma. It would not 
be for another reason, moreover, that so often the myths 
dwell on issues of creation, in order to account for an 
originating scene. We could, based on the lightness of 
Barthes and the formulations of Lacan, take myths as 
collective fictions that cover the Real of helplessness. 
In this sense, analysis of myths reveals the grammar of 
helplessness inherent in the modality of subjectivation in 
which it is inscribed. In other words, it is possible to draw 
clinical consequences from mythological examination. 
Maria Rita Kehl’s contribution below (2002, pp. 68-69) 
helps consolidate this concept:
If helplessness is part of the human condition, great 
formations of culture work to provide, in a world 
made of language, some reasonably solid structures 
of support for these beings by definition straying 
from the order of nature. Tradition, in a way, situates 
people in the society in which they live, explaining 
what is expected of each one from the place they 
occupy from birth. Religion produces meaning 
for life and death, and guides moral choices; the 
myths explain why things are as they are, and set 
necessary prohibitions to maintain the social bond.
On the one hand, Mythology, as an imagistic 
language, condenses the symbolic arrangements of culture; 
on the other hand, it places the frames of the imagination 
on the other. For Lacan (1954/2008), myths lie at the heart 
of analytic experience. Proposed thusly by the French 
psychoanalyst:
If we focus on the definition of myth as a certain 
objective representation of an epos or a gestate that 
expresses in an imaginary way the fundamental 
relations characteristic of a certain human being in 
a given period, if we understand it as the latent or 
patent social manifestation, virtual or conducted, full 
or emptied of its meaning, we can then certainly find 
its function in the experience of the neurotic. (p. 10)
In describing the structure of the myth, we see 
that Lacan brings himself closer to the Freudian notion 
of a family romance: he can be historicized – insofar as 
he allows himself to be converted into a narrative referred 
to another temporality – and hystericized – insofar as the 
subject can create himself in this narrative by questioning 
the Other about himself. Could this Lacan’s intention 
(1954/2008) when he proposes the expression “individual 
myth of the neurotic”?
Whether or not a myth is credible, whether it 
harmonizes or conflicts with the notion of reality, these 
may be secondary inquiries. Lacan (1969-1970/1992) has 
argued that one can talk a lot of nonsense about myths, 
because myths are the field of stupidity – and therein lies 
the truth. In Atlas, Borges (2010) brings us the image of 
a colloquy between two Greeks: “The theme of dialogue 
is abstract. They sometimes refer to myths, which both 
disbelieve. . . . They agree on a single point; they know 
that it’s impossible for the discussion to arrive at a truth” 
(p. 37). The Hellenes imagined by Borges, inserted in a 
fertile universe of mythology, allowed themselves to be 
placed at a critical distance, but still return to myths to look 
for the truth that they supposed they could decant from 
themselves. Similar to Lacan’s (1974-1975/2002) position 
at the R. S. I. seminar, when, noting that a negated truth 
(Verneinung) has as much weight as an affirmed truth 
(Bejahung), pointing out that the imagination is where all 
truth is enunciated. In addition, a few years before, Lacan 
(1969-1970/1992) had proposed that “the semi-saying is 
the internal law of every kind of enunciation of truth, and 
the myth best embodies it” (p. 103). Thus, the imaginary 
character of myths, impregnated with the symbolizations 
that so intrigued Freud, provides material to distribute 
narratives that will allow them to be destructured and 
découpaged, revealing the configuration of helplessness 
that underlies them. Wouldn’t myths be, then, a form of 
confession of truth under the structure of fiction that is 
characteristic of it?
If, as Lacan (1953/1998) points out in Function and 
Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, “what 
we teach the subject to recognize as their unconscious 
is their history” (p. 263), we cannot ignore the fact that 
this history is stuffed by other histories. In the same 
text, shortly before pointing out that the unconscious 
is the discourse of the Other, Lacan postulates that the 
unconscious is “the chapter of my story that is marked by 
a blank or occupied by my lie: it is the censored chapter” 
(p. 260). But the truth can be redeemed; most of the time, 
it is already written elsewhere. What other places would 
these be? Lacan names them: they are the monuments (the 
body, eyewitness of existence); the archived documents 
(the childhood memories in their semi-impenetrability 
character); semantic evolution (the particular lexicon 
and the mannerisms that were appropriate); the vestiges 
(evidences of distortions perceived at the level of 
speech); and traditions – described as the “legends that 
in heroic form convey my history” (p. 261). The French 
psychoanalyst thus points out that a part of the unconscious 
is preserved in great shared narratives – in epos, epic 
poems, and in gesta, heroic deeds; in other words, in the 
mythical formulations – which command subjectivation.
Let us then take myths as a construction, in the 
Freudian sense of the term, which, as Lacan (1974/1993) 
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points out, try to reveal what is operating at the level of 
the unconscious structure. Myths work, therefore, as an 
enunciator of what happens behind the scenes, to use the 
metaphor of Ana Vicentini de Azevedo (2004). However, 
the author warns that mythological content should not 
be interpreted as an archetype (that is, as if it bears a 
crystallized and uniform sense), since myths themselves 
are defined by the multiplicity of meanings: the relations 
between the signifiers present in the myth, both in its 
intratextuality and in its intertextuality, that reveal the 
fabric that constitutes it. As Lévi-Strauss (2008) stresses, 
“the substance of the myth is found neither in style nor in 
narration, nor in syntax, but in the story that is told in it” 
(p. 225). This story, as we have seen, glides over the fabric 
of culture toward other narratives and replaces a textuality 
of another order. The word, in its significant dimension, 
gains emphasis in the interpretation of myths. “Put it in 
other words, the myth places language in the scene of the 
word, which is much of what psychoanalysis will later 
explain, from the logic of the unconscious, both in its 
theory and in its clinical practice”, Azevedo states (2004, 
p. 19). The relation between the mythical constructions 
and the logic of the unconscious, structured as language, 
is thus placed, insofar as the myth becomes metonymy 
and metaphor, thus calling for interpretation.
Approaching pop culture
So far, a number of terms have been evoked 
indistinctly – folklore, tradition, legend – to designate 
quite specific and possibly heterogeneous modalities of 
fiction. These narrative forms interest us as they constitute 
clues and convergences to approach pop culture, a concept 
of delicate circumscription. The term itself is captious: the 
pop contraction suggests that the phenomenon belongs to 
the level of the popular, but this equivalence needs to be 
questioned. In the same way that MPB, an acronym for 
Brazilian popular music, today encompasses a niche that 
is significantly removed from what could be understood 
as popular music in Brazil, speaking of pop culture is not 
the same as talking about popular culture, but this last 
notion will be useful for the analysis.
The current pop culture was not, obviously, 
analyzed by Freud – which does not mean that we cannot 
find guidance in his works. Although Freud has privileged 
notably scholarly productions in his writings, such as 
the Hellenistic narratives (recall Oedipus, Narcissus, 
Plato’s Banquet – 428-347 a.C/2016) and Renaissance 
exponents (let us see the attention devoted to Leonardo 
da Vinci and Michelangelo), he also examined a popular 
novel like Gradiva, by Wilhelm Jensen. In some respects, 
it is possible to see the relationship between Freud’s 
commentary on Jensen’s book and Dreams in Folklore, 
written in 1911, in partnership with David Oppenheim, 
but only published in 1957: both texts deal with dream 
stories obtained outside of a clinical scene, evidencing 
the possibility of interpreting cultural processes in a 
similar way to that introduced in The Interpretation of 
Dreams (Freud, 1900/2006a, 1900/2006b). If in Delusion 
and Dream, Freud (1907/2006c) affirms the feasibility 
of illustrating the analytical method using an artificial 
dream, in the text of 1911, the emphasis falls on the 
oneiric scope captured by Oppenheim together with the 
traditions of the community. Freud’s opinion is categorical: 
“folklore interprets the oneiric symbols in the same way 
as psychoanalysis” (Freud & Oppenheim, 1957/2006, 
p. 220). That is, the founder of analytic discourse took 
popular culture – folk lore, the knowledge of the people – 
as an aspect of interpretation of the psyche, a recognition 
similar to that given to writers and art in general. It leads 
the way for one to use the method of dream interpretation 
in the analysis of the fictions produced by the culture – a 
set where myths are inserted.
Traditionally, culture is presented by the antithetical 
pair “high culture” (or elite culture) and “low culture” 
(or popular culture). Peter Burke (2010), for example, 
faced with the difficulty of circumscribing his object of 
study – popular culture – chooses to define it through 
its negative: an unofficial culture, the culture of the non-
elite. In the contemporary world, however, the boundaries 
become less clear; Gilles Lipovetsky and Jean Serroy (2011) 
point out the erosion of the barriers that distinguished 
high culture from low culture, as brought on by media 
and mercantile articulation in the cultural industry that 
operates at the global level2. “For the first time there is a 
culture no longer produced for a social and intellectual 
elite, but for everyone, without frontiers of countries or 
classes” (p. 71). Connected to the intensity of consumer 
routines, the effect is a commodification of culture – and, 
simultaneously, a culturalization of the commodity.
A revolution has been produced: while art henceforth 
aligns itself with the rules of the mercantile and media 
world, information technologies, cultural industries, 
brands, and capitalism itself construct a culture, this 
is a system of values, goals and myths. (p. 10)
Also, Jameson (1995) looks at the problematic 
dichotomy between “high culture” and mass culture – 
hardly sustainable from a historical perspective, since 
they make up a dialectic of interdependence in which 
today’s scholar may be the vulgar one of yesterday. The 
author postulates that in the mass culture, resulting 
from capitalism’s advance, there is very little that can 
be recognized as popular culture except under “very 
specific and marginalized” conditions. In that sense, 
we can agree that in what remains of the popular, folk 
is phagocytosed by pop, losing its distinctive locations 
2 We would also need to find out whether this process is indeed global 
and whether cultural products are transiting globally or in a colonial 
relationship. In Brazil, pop culture, for example, possesses very strong 
features of Americanization, although it is possible to find here and there 
references to Latin or Japanese cultures, possibly tributary to certain 
television stations. This important question, however, goes beyond the 
ambitions of this article.
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to be replaced by commercial reproducibility – thereby 
expanding its capacity for penetration into cultural strata: 
“the pop play, through repetition, becomes insensibly part 
of the existential fabric of our own lives, in such a way 
that what we hear is ourselves”, says Jameson (1995, p. 20).
The concept of mass culture also assists in 
formulating the notion of pop culture, although not to be 
confused with it. Mass culture is described by Lipovetsky 
(2009) as a “formidable machine governed by the law of 
accelerated renewal, of ephemeral success, of seduction, of 
marginal difference” (p. 238). As an effect of the market’s 
influence on mass compositions, Lipovetsky emphasizes its 
character of impermanence3. For this reason, the philosopher 
assumes that mass culture is “a culture without trace, 
without future, without substantial subjective prolongation” 
(p. 244). Curiously, however, most of the productions 
mentioned by the author in this distant year of 1987 – like 
James Bond (Glen, 1987), Star Trek (Roddenberry, 1987-
1994) and Superman (Gupta, 1987) – follow drives in the 
contemporaneity: in the last decade, the British secret agent 
starred four films, the new crew of the Enterprise reached 
the screens on two occasions (and there is another film in 
production) and the last son of Krypton was interpreted by 
two different actors in three distinct productions. If mass 
culture is evanescent, pop culture seems to create points of 
resistance. It should be recognized, however, that Lipovetsky 
emphasizes cinema in relation to other cultural industries 
by the increased durability of its products, as opposed to 
the programmed obsolescence of albums and books. Our 
position, then, is that pop culture does leave traces – and 
its subjective effects are far from negligible.
A scene from the French film Intouchables portrays 
this phenomenon with great acuity: at the birthday 
celebration of Phillipe, a quadriplegic millionaire, there 
is a chamber orchestra, hired to entertain guests (Nakache 
& Toledano, 2011). Among the house’s employees, Driss 
emphasizes that little importance is given to the private 
concert, preferring the sound of bands like Earth, Wind and 
Fire. Phillipe tries to introduce Driss to erudite music and 
asks the orchestra to perform some classics. On hearing 
the chords of Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov’s “Flight of the 
Bumblebee”, Driss expresses a broad smile.
‘Do you know this one?,’ Phillipe asks.
‘Sure!,’ Driss answers. ‘It’s from Tom & Jerry!’
Obviously, Driss’s comic response is naive. More 
than being a mistake, it is a provocation, a twist, as if to 
say: this type of culture is also my culture, I can also enjoy 
it and it is also part of my story, even if my trajectory 
goes through the suburbs of Paris and not through its 
3 In his reflection, Lipovetsky (2009) creates the possibility of a dialogue 
with psychoanalysis: “like dreams and sayings, mass culture essentially 
has repercussions here and now” (p. 244). Psychoanalysts, however, 
are well aware of the temporal dilation of the reverberations of the 
unconscious, which extend far beyond the “here and now” – they affect 
both the construction of the future and the resignification of the past.
art galleries. And perhaps the condition of possibility 
of this democratization of access – and of the very 
constitution of the field of pop culture – passes through 
the commodification of culture. Above value judgments 
on a possible barbarism and inauthenticity of mass culture 
– especially from the Frankfurt school theoreticians, who 
did not escape Jameson, Lipovetsky and Serroy –, we 
must remember that the effects of the market on culture 
in certain aspects made it available to population levels 
that otherwise would be completely unaware.
We use the reference to popular culture and mass 
culture to propose pop culture as a third margin, not 
necessarily located in productions of high prestige and 
undeniable aesthetic recognition, nor exactly situated 
at the level of the ordinary or vulgar. Pop culture is not 
sold for millions of dollars at Sotheby’s auctions, nor 
does it require the highest scholarship to appreciate its 
aesthetic value. Ultimately, it is not restricted to acting 
as an intermediary between art and capital, between the 
noble and the populace, between the learned and the 
uneducated; it dismantles these boundaries at the same 
time as it constitutes an unprecedented territory that speaks 
to many subjects indiscriminately. An important notion 
of pop culture is written by Thiago Soares (2014, p. 140):
We attribute pop culture, to the set of practices, 
experiences and products guided by media logic, 
whose origin is entertainment; it is situated, mainly, 
from means of production connected to culture 
industries (music, cinema, television, editorial, 
among others) and it establishes forms of enjoyment 
and consumption that permeate a certain sense of 
community, the act of belonging or the sharing 
of affinities which situate individuals within a 
transnational and globalizing sense.
By establishing the notion of pop culture not 
only from the products that reside there, but also – and 
especially – in relation to the practices and experiences 
that are inscribed or derived from pop territory, Soares 
emphasizes that the subjects crossed by it are not just 
consumers: they are interpreters. This understanding 
helps dismantle an illusion of consumer passivity from 
pop culture to its commodities. If pop culture develops 
as a consequence of the commodification of culture, it 
will also manifest the tension of that brand within its 
own objects. In this sense, the aesthetic of pop deserves 
to be recognized as a way of existing and resisting the 
injunctions and contradictions of late capitalism. See 
Deadpool, for example: a superhero movie that, oscillating 
between self-deprecating humor and satire, makes fun of 
superheroes, the way Hollywood conceives superheroes, 
and the way the public reveres superheroes (Miller, 2016). 
The film works only because it absorbs and returns to 
the viewer the consumer paradox of which both are a 
consequence of – while presenting a sufficiently original 
aesthetic experience.
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Thus, pop culture comprises a mobile, transnational, 
self-referential, multiform area in its media constitution, 
with intergenerational traces and whose consumption is 
not confined to a single social stratum. Conceived in a 
radical interactivity between public and work, pop culture 
itself is marked by its indeterminacy – it is unfeasible to 
reduce it to its works or to determine it from them by the 
fact that the very productions that generate it have a mobile 
status: they can be replaced by new ones, abandoned or, 
worse, forgotten. That is why the definition of pop culture 
is so thorny: when one tries to circumscribe it, it is no 
longer there – although we may, a posteriori, identify its 
traces. This field is presented as a littoral, evoking the 
Lacanian concept that Edson Sousa (2006), with great 
subtlety, defines as “a meeting between heterogeneous 
parts” (p. 49) – but a voracious, arrogant and wild coastline, 
permanently updating itself, which produces and devours 
icons, which builds and buries representations, irreducibly 
contemporary, that dialogues with scholar, cult, mainstream, 
geek and trash. We understand that it is from this littorary 
condition, condensation of littoral and literary, that pop 
culture assumes, in the contemporary world, a part of the 
fuwwnction previously reserved for mythical narratives.
Pop culture and myths in contemporary 
times
Here, then, is the point that we would like to stress in 
this writing: what, after all, is our mythology today? What 
stories shape the fabric of our time and express the formations 
of the unconscious? What are the narratives that constitute 
us as subjects in the contemporary? Clinical experience 
suggests some significant transformations over the previous 
decades. In the wake of recent capitalism, local legends were 
almost completely replaced by global fictions. The children 
of present-day Brazil may not know beings like caipora or 
curupira, but they all know who Batman and Spider-Man 
are. Adults share reasonably similar representations of what 
a zombie would be, surely closer to the image proposed by 
George Romero’s films than the Voodoo tradition, from 
which that figure first appeared. The most widely circulated 
versions of Hans Christian Andersen’s short stories are not 
from Hans Christian Andersen; they are from Disney. The 
Roman deities, outside their pantheon, continue governing 
destiny from the horoscope section. And the turbulent 
relations of Star Wars kinship – an admitted quilt composed 
of fragments of samurai, western, medieval fantasy and 
science fiction – are decidedly more famous than those of 
The Theban Trilogy.
Mircea Eliade (1972) postulates that, in modern 
societies, narrative prose has taken its place in traditional 
societies by reciting myths, and defends the possibility of 
dissecting the mythic structure present in some novels – 
similar to comics, American comic books, whose characters, 
according to the author, “present the modern version of 
mythological or folklore heroes” (p. 129). Eliade is not 
insensitive to the expressive mobilization of the readers 
about changes in the conception of the characters – changes 
generally related to thorny subjects, such as sexuality and 
death. If we follow the comic books of the day, such a remark 
will not surprise us: both Marvel and DC, the two largest 
comic book publishers in the United States, developed arcs in 
which profound transformations occurred to the characters, 
never without reverberations within their clientele. We were 
amazed to realize that Eliade had detected the magnitude of 
these editorial interventions as early as 1962, a time when 
readers’ communication with publishers was through letters 
and phone calls. Since then, Spider-Man’s uniform has been 
taken over by a black character, Thor has changed his gender 
and Superman, the zenith of Western heroism, has died (but 
of course he has recovered). And all these characters have 
gained quite solid film versions. Expanding to the cinema, 
the comic book world has attempted, in its own way, to keep 
pace with changes in society (with greater conservatism 
on DC’s part than Marvel, one must acknowledge). 
Agreeing that it responds to a mythical function, it is easy 
to understand the reasons for protest when modifications 
are implemented – because, as Diana Corso and Mário 
Corso (2011) point out, “fiction is not only a form of fun, 
it is also the vehicle through which an imaginary canon, 
used to elaborate some aspect of our subjectivity or social 
reality, can be established” (p. 24). And psychoanalysts are 
familiar with what commitment the subjects preserve their 
defense strategies against helplessness, however unstable, 
anachronistic or ill-founded they are.
We believe ourselves to be rationalists, as Mário 
Corso (2004) observes. Late modernity, in general, 
encapsulated scientism, technicalism and reason as the 
premise and goal of its project of humanity. In other 
words, we assume we are (or wish to be) free from the 
evil influences of magical thinking, religious dogmatism, 
superstition, and belief. But, as the author recalls, the time 
of the myth is not over. We continue to be told by fictions 
that constitute us, although the character of these narratives 
is hopelessly crossed by modern rationality, which despises 
everything that does not follow its own standards of truth. 
“At every moment, the media manufacture a generation 
of monsters (especially for the young audience) that are 
consumed to exhaustion and then discarded”, Corso (2004, 
p. 14) recalls. But even in what is discarded – and perhaps 
especially in them – we can find certain constancies, 
common points, repetitions of form and content. It is 
enough to recall Levi-Strauss’ observation on the function 
of repetition in myths, which operates in the unveiling 
of its structure, so that the value of recapitulation and 
dispersion can be reinvigorated in the interpretation of these 
narratives. It would be possible to deduce that in the exercise 
of retelling the same story over and over again, through 
remakes, prequels, sequences, reboots and spin-offs, the 
film industry incurs a repetition automatism, capitulating 
to creative exhaustion and appealing to beaten formulas 
to keep their coffers lined. It is necessary to consider, 
however, that the fascination exerted by these retellings 
is precisely due to the fact that repetition expresses an 
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attribute of myth – not only an addiction resulting from 
the commodification of culture. As the myth defined by 
the “set of all its versions”, as Lévi-Strauss (2008, p. 233) 
proposes, each retake of the narrative, each update, makes 
the structure on which the narrative rests more visible, 
allowing us to glimpse to what extent the variations of the 
narrative clutch the Achilles heel of culture.
To consider that we are crossed by mythical 
narratives that inhabit pop culture implies, recognizing 
its character of entertainment, treating it with seriousness. 
Just as mythological examination is conducive to clinical 
developments, to look at pop culture and its productions 
may offer some keys to understanding contemporary 
malaise configurations, especially if we consider that the 
fictions of culture are forms of resistance to injunctions 
of daily life. The great fictional narratives, whether 
they are true or false stories, in Eliade’s terms, carry a 
structure that makes them bearers of knowledge about the 
subjects – a veiled knowledge that requires the interpreter’s 
operation to come to the surface. It would be important to 
problematize the psychic consequences of the displacement 
of subjectivist narratives from the mythological field to the 
terrain of pop culture: that effects on the constitution of the 
subject produces the projection of the cultural industry as 
Other, that forms of malaise present themselves from the 
repositioning of the tradition – no longer as a treasure of 
the ancients, but as a code of the contemporaries – which, 
in the face of the Real, the productions of pop culture 
propose to conceal, and so on. As Birman (2012) points 
out, “there is no longer any doubt about the changes in the 
forms of malaise in the contemporary world, in contrast 
to what the Freudian discourse sharply described. The 
picture today is different, starkly different” (p. 63). We 
are entirely in agreement and if the present scenario has 
specifics in relation to the panorama explored by Freud, 
it is up to us to question the modulations in the discourse 
of the Other that rediscover the desires, the ideals and 
the helplessness of our time – and, consequently, affect 
the clinical field, leading us to question the diagnostic 
categories themselves that support analytical practice.
Regarding this aspect, however, this writing has 
few answers to offer; we are content, for now, to present 
a method. In short, what we have here is the possibility 
of examining the manifestations of pop culture, and more 
specifically the film productions that are inscribed in it, in 
their mythical aspect, as collective narratives that signify 
and articulate helplessness under the slogan of fiction, 
interpreting them in the way that Freud analyzed oneiric 
compositions. In other words, analyze the movies as myths 
and interpret them as dreams. For in the end, perhaps, 
mythical allegories derive from the same processes of 
deformation that affect dreams. As proposed by Christian 
Dunker and Ana Lucilia Rodrigues (2015, p. 15):
If movies are our myths and if the psychoanalyst 
is a kind of modern shaman, interpreter, translator 
and articulator of the individual myths of neurotics, 
we are on the level of commensurability between 
different fictional systems and their possible symbolic 
obstructions. In this sense, psychoanalysis can interpret 
cinema with eventual gains and losses for both sides. 
In this aspect, cinema is especially sensitive to capture 
and name the grammar of social suffering, previously 
indicating the forms of symptoms and narrative 
supports which the clinic will use.
To work like this represents a rescue of pop culture 
in relation to the condition of deject of the culture that is 
usually attributed to it in the most prestigious means. This, 
in a way, is a faithfully Freudian enterprise: the founder 
of psychoanalysis used as the raw material the rejects of 
scientific thought of his time, such as dreams, slips of the 
tongue and so called Witz, and gave them a high degree of 
composition of his theory. It is Freud himself (1908/2006d) 
who stresses the pertinence of listening to the everyday life 
of culture by choosing, in his examination of the poet and 
the fantasist, not the authors who are “most applauded by 
critics, but the less pretentious novelists, novels and short 
stories, which, however, enjoy the esteem of a wide circle 
of readers of both sexes” (p. 139). Perhaps Freud shared 
the hypothesis that if these productions are consumed 
with such voracity, it is because they say something about 
the subjects who read them. If mythical narratives of the 
contemporary dwell in pop culture – and in particular 
in the cinema –, there is something there that interests 
psychoanalysis and which, following Lacan’s (1953/1998) 
recommendation, allows us to maintain the subjectivity 
of our time in the horizon of our work.
Psicanálise e cultura pop: os mitos no contemporâneo
Resumo: O que a cultura pop tem a dizer sobre os sujeitos de nosso tempo? Neste ensaio, os autores propõem uma via de 
leitura das produções da cultura pop apostando que, na contemporaneidade, ela floresce, no território tradicionalmente 
reservado à mitologia, como enunciante dos modos de subjetivação. Retomando a abordagem psicanalítica dos mitos a partir 
de Freud e Lacan, observa-se que a função de recobrir o Real do desamparo, em um tempo que se crê racionalista, passa 
a ser desempenhada por ficções que deixam rastros e possibilitam, através da variância e da repetição, desvelar a estrutura 
subjacente que lhes engendra. Por fim, propõe-se que, se essas produções são consumidas com tamanha voracidade, é porque 
dizem algo sobre os sujeitos que a elas se lançam – ou seja, sobre a subjetividade desta época.
Palavras-chave: psicanálise, cultura pop, mitos.
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Psychanalyse et culture pop : les mythes dans la contemporanéité
Résumé : Qu’est-ce que la culture pop peut dire sur les sujets de notre temps ? Dans cet essai, les auteurs proposent une voie de 
lecture des productions de la culture pop en pariant que, dans la contemporanéité, elle fleurit dans le territoire traditionnellement 
réservé à la mythologie comme énonciateur des modes de subjectivation. Si l’on reprend l’approche psychanalytique sur les 
mythes à partir de Freud et Lacan, on observe que la fonction de recouvrir le Réel de la détresse, dans un temps qu’on croit 
rationaliste, est accomplie par des fictions qui laissent des traces et permettent, grâce à la variance et à la répétition, de révéler 
la structure sous-jacente qui les engendre. Enfin, on propose que, si ces productions sont consommées avec une telle voracité, 
c’est parce qu’elles disent quelque chose sur les sujets qui sur elles se lancent – c’est-à-dire sur la subjectivité d’une époque.
Mots-clés : psychanalyse, culture pop, mythes.
El psicoanálisis y la cultura pop: los mitos en la contemporaneidad
Resumen: ¿Qué tiene que decir la cultura pop sobre los sujetos de nuestro tiempo? En este ensayo, los autores proponen 
una vía de lectura de las producciones de la cultura pop asumiendo que, hoy en día, ella florece, en el territorio reservado 
tradicionalmente a la mitología, como enunciante de los modos de subjetivación. Al reanudar el enfoque psicoanalítico de los 
mitos de Freud y Lacan, se observa que la función de recubrir lo real del desamparo, en un tiempo que se cree racionalista, pasa 
a ser desempeñada por ficciones que dejan huellas y hacen posible, a través de la varianza y la repetición, develar la estructura 
subyacente que las engendra. Por último, se propone que, si estas producciones se consumen con tanta voracidad, es porque 
dicen algo sobre los sujetos que a ellas se arrojan, es decir, sobre la subjetividad de esta época.
Palabras clave: psicoanálisis; cultura pop; mitos.
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